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Abstract 
We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee 
choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private 
information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this 
shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal their hawkishness to observers better fits the 
data.  The  motivation  for  signalling  is  consistent  with  wanting  to  control  inflation 
expectations, but not career concerns or pleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of 
capture by industry. The paper suggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be 
important for explaining dynamics in experts’ policy choices. 
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In many, if not most, public policy settings, policymakers act repeatedly. Competition
commissioners, utility regulators, and ombudsmen are some of the many public ocials
who serve in their positions for several years, during which time they repeatedly make
similar technical policy decisions. While the dynamic behavior of politicians has received
a relatively large amount of attention in the economics literature,1 the dynamic behavior
of unelected policymaking experts is less well understood. There are two broad reasons
why behavior might change over time: rst, experts might receive additional information
as they accumulate experience, which in turn changes their beliefs about the payos of al-
ternative policy choices; second, incentives might change over time, so that experts begin
to favor policy stances they initially avoided, even given the same information. Under-
standing the extent to which either of these two forces plays a role in policy dynamics is
clearly crucial for designing the institutional environment in which policymakers operate.
This paper explores these issues in the particular context of monetary policymaking
on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It begins by establishing
a surprising fact: the average member of the MPC votes for signicantly lower rates after
accumulating a year and a half of experience. In the remainder of the paper, we explore
a number of hypotheses that relate to both learning and incentives to understand what
drives this eect.
Before this, we present a model of policymaking as a Bayesian decision problem in
which MPC members receive private signals on whether the economy is inationary or
not. If these signals show sucient evidence of inationary pressures, then a member
chooses a high interest rate; otherwise, she chooses a low interest rate. The amount
of evidence that a member needs in order to vote for the high rate is interpreted as a
measure of toughness on ination, or hawkishness. The rst hypothesis we test with
the model is whether, as they gain experience on the MPC, members also gain expertise
that allows them to better judge whether inationary shocks have hit. We show that
such learning-by-doing would manifest itself as an increasing tendency to vote against
the interest rate that the public expects to be chosen. We then take this prediction to
the data, and show there is no evidence for it. Instead, the parameter that measures
hawkishness shifts signicantly after 18 months of service. The remaining hypotheses we
explore all concern why measured hawkishness shifts.
The second hypothesis we test is whether learning about the structure of the macroe-
conomy is an important explanatory factor in the shift in hawkishness. Three ndings
make this unlikely: (1) new members vote for signicantly higher rates than their other,
more experienced, colleagues; (2) the shift occurs for nearly all members; and (3) the
1See, for example, Drazen (2001), who reviews the literature on the political business cycle.
1variance of individual estimates of the hawkishness parameter do not increase with time.
While we do not construct a formal model of learning, we argue that this combination of
results is dicult to reconcile with either a common or private learning model.
Since changes in information do not appear to explain MPC dynamics, we next explore
hypotheses related to incentives. An established idea in the monetary literature (Backus
and Drill 1985a,b, Vickers 1986) is that monetary policymakers signal hawkishness in
order to anchor the public's expectations of future ination and improve policy outcomes.
We adapt our voting model to allow for such signalling, and generate dynamics using a
two-step logic. First, in equilibrium a policymaker that cares about signalling a hawkish
type will vote for high rates more often than his innate policy preferences would otherwise
dictate. Second, the strength of the signalling incentive declines over time as the future
horizon over which reputation pays o shortens. So, experienced members vote more
according to their innate preferences, and therefore vote for low rates more often than
their earlier selves. Predictions (1)-(3) above come out of this model. An additional
prediction is also generated by this model: the degree to which hawkish and dovish types
shift in their toughness on ination should be the same. We test this hypothesis and nd
supportive evidence.
Our model is also consistent (and observationally equivalent to) models in which
members signal hawkishness due to other motives, but we can examine whether the data
supports these. The rst potential motive is career concerns: members might want to
signal to potential future employers. We nd little correlation between the observed shift
in hawkishness and term length or occupational background, which points against the
relevance of career concerns. The second potential motive is a desire to \t in": new
members may conform to the norms of the MPC, which stress the importance of control-
ling ination. While this story has a more behavioral avor, it ts within the framework
of standard signalling models. We see that even members with extensive experience at
the Bank prior to their appointment to the MPC display a shift in hawkishness, which
indicates that conformity is unlikely to be the driving force behind the voting dynamics.
This leaves policy motivations as the main candidate for explaining signalling.
The nal incentive story we explore is regulatory capture. More specically, members
might vote for lower rates over time because of persuasion eorts of the nancial sector.
We compare the votes of a subset of members who have served on both the MPC and
a shadow MPC assembled by the Times of London newspaper, and show that they are
generally less hawkish on the latter, which is inconsistent with the capture hypothesis.
Our paper thus makes two contributions. First, it shows that signalling better ts
the observed voting dynamics on the MPC than learning or capture. Not only does the
signalling model do a better job of rationalizing the observed shift in hawkishness, but
it also generates an independent prediction that we validate. This nding is important
2for committee design; for example, it implies that rst-year hawkishness will still arise if
members serve an apprenticeship period in the Bank prior to their MPC service.2 Our
second contribution is to narrow down why voters engage in signalling by rejecting career
concerns and tting in. Instead, policy-motivated signalling is the main alternative that
emerges from our analysis.
Policy-motivated signalling is relevant in any context in which the outcomes about
which the policymaker cares depend on the public's expectations about her actions. For
example, the willingness of a company to engage in anticompetitive practices presumably
depends on its belief that competition authorities will investigate and prosecute violations
of competition law. By taking tough stances at the beginning of her career, an industry
regulator can signal her intention to crack down on malfeasance, thereby discouraging
bad behavior by rms in the future and further achieving her policy objective. Our
paper indicates that exploring policy-motivated signalling could contribute to a better
understanding of experts' policy choices in environments beyond monetary policy.
1.1 Literature Review
Our work is related to the existing literature on macroeconomic learning, signalling in
monetary policy, and the career concerns of policy makers. Since at least the work
of Brainard (1967), monetary economists have understood that monetary policymakers
do not have full information about the structure of the economy, and that this has
implications for optimal policy choices. A large literature has subsequently developed that
examines how policymakers update their beliefs as more information becomes available;
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is the seminal reference.3 Papers have examined the eects
of policymakers learning about the behavior of ination (Sargent 1999, Cho, Williams,
and Sargent 2002, Primiceri 2006), as well as the supply-side of the economy, such as
the natural rate of unemployment,(Orphanides and Williams 2005) and the level (and
growth) of potential output (Bullard and Eusepi 2005). While we do not dispute that
learning about the macroeconomy inuences policy, our ndings suggest that it does not
generate short-run dynamics, which is not to say that it is not important over longer time
periods.
The theoretical literature on policy-motivated signalling in monetary policy builds
on the work of Barro and Gordon (1983a) and Barro and Gordon (1983b), who were
2In 2002 Michael Howard, then Treasury Spokesperson for the Conservative Party in the UK, argued
that external members' terms should be lengthened from three years to four using the following logic:
\(since) the rst year is spent learning how the MPC works, the present arrangements leave only two
years in which independent members can make an active contribution" (Select Committee on Economic
Aairs 2003). While we nd that rst year behavior is indeed dierent from later behavior, our results
suggest that Howard's intuition for why was incorrect.
3This literature also explores learning by households about the monetary policy regime; see, for
example, Erceg and Levin (2003).
3among the rst to establish the importance for policymakers of establishing credibility as
ination ghters to keep actual ination in check. These papers show that such credibility
can emerge through an innitely repeated game. Backus and Drill (1985a), Backus and
Drill (1985b), and Vickers (1986), all borrowing from the signalling models of Kreps and
Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), argue that credibility can also emerge in
a nitely repeated game with type uncertainty.4 In their equilibria, policymakers signal
their toughness on ination to the public early in their careers, but gradually become less
tough on ination over time as the end of the game nears and the value of reputation
declines. While signalling is well understood as a theoretical device, we assess its empirical
plausibility.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on career concerns in political economy.
Maskin and Tirole (2004) study the role of preference signalling in a career concerns
model in which politicians get payos from re-election. In their model, signalling induces
politicians to choose politically correct actions more often than they otherwise would
early in their careers. Besley and Coate (2003) and Leaver (2009) provide evidence
that career concerns are important for determining the policy choices of public utility
commissioners in the United States (regarding prices and the incidence of rate reviews,
respectively). Our paper makes the counter point that signalling for a policy motivate is,
in some settings at least, potentially more important than signalling for a career motive.
2 The Basic Dynamic Fact
The MPC has met once a month since June 1997 to set UK interest rates. It has nine
standing members (ve Bank executives, or internal members, and four external mem-
bers) whom the Bank encourages to vote independently. Plurality rule determines the
interest rate, with the Governor deciding in the case of a tie. Disagreements between
members are the rule rather than the exception; 64% of the meetings in the sample have
at least one deviation from the committee majority and there are many meetings decided
by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3.5
Throughout the paper, we analyze the MPC voting record up to March 2009, when
the interest rate reached its eective zero lower bound and a period of quantitative easing
began; from this time, the main MPC decision concerned the additional policy of how
many assets purchases to make. This sample yields a total of 142 meetings, and 1246
individual votes.6 All voting data is available from the Bank of England website. The
4Sibert (2003) uses a similar analysis to study the role of committees in monetary policy; our paper
does not account for the inuence of other committee members on an individual's vote, and instead
treats each voter as an independent decision maker.
5For more institutional details, see Hansen and McMahon (2011).
6We drop the emergency meeting of September 2001.
4variable voteit gives the desired change in interest rate of member i in period t. So, for
example, if a member voted for no change, voteit = 0, and if he voted for an increase of 25
basis points, voteit = 0:25. Most members serve three-year terms (36 meetings) although
some members have served longer (the current Governor, Mervyn King, is present in all
142 of our meetings), and others have served less than 36 meetings.
As we are interested in voting dynamics, we begin by examining whether, in a reduced
form sense, there is any behavior of interest. To do this, we dene a dummy variable to





0 if member i has served in 18 or less meetings
1 if member i has served in more than 18 meetings
(1)
Accordingly, we dene a member as new if D(Experienced)it = 0 and experienced if
D(Experienced)it = 1.
As a rst look at dynamic voting behavior, we estimate the following relationship:
voteit = i + D(Experienced)it + t + it (2)
This equation includes both member and time xed eects (i, the member xed eect,
captures a member specic intercept while t, the time xed eect, captures the average
vote in period t). The results, reported in column (1) of table 1, show that as members
serve more time, they vote for lower interest rates on average.7 Because we have included
member xed eects in (2), this does not reect changing composition of the committee,
but rather indicates that something at the individual level systematically shifts over time.
The rest of the paper is concerned with what this \something" actually is.
We can also show that the reduction in average interest rates with experience at
the individual level is robust to alternative denitions of experience. We create two
alternative dummy variables called D(Experienced - 12M)it and D(Experienced - 24M)it
along the lines of equation 1, except that these measure experience as any tenure over 12
and 24 meetings, respectively. The results with these alternative denitions are reported
in columns (2) and (3) of table 1; again, we nd that experienced members vote for lower
rates on average. Since all three dummy variables give the same qualitative results, we
will use the 18 meeting denition (as in equation (1)) simply because it represents half
of a standard MPC member's term and therefore splits the sample into subsamples of
roughly similar size.
7This fact was previously established in Hansen and McMahon (2008).





D(Experienced - 12M) -0.019*
[0.093]
D(Experienced - 24M) -0.016*
[0.092]
Constant 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-squared 0.903 0.903 0.903
Number of members 27 27 27
Model Panel OLS Panel OLS Panel OLS
Member eects? FE FE FE
Time eects? YES YES YES
Notes: This regression presents OLS estimates of equation (2) with standard errors clus-
tered by member. They show that, controlling for member and time xed eects, members
with experience (dened as 18 meetings experience in column (1), 12 meetings in column
(2), and 24 meetings in column (3)) vote for lower interest rates than new members.
3 Distinguishing Changes in Ination Toughness from
Changes in Condence
To understand why members' voting behavior changes over time, one must rst consider
the determinants of interest rate decisions and how to empirically measure them. The
rst major factor that we consider is how tough a given member is on ination (or, in the
language of the monetary literature, his \hawkishness"). The second is his private forecast
of ination conditions, and in particular the weight he puts on it (or, as we will term
it, \condence"). Hansen and McMahon (2011) develop an empirical methodology to
separately identify these, and show that each is important for explaining the MPC voting
record. This section rst briey reviews this approach, and then uses it to examine
the extent to which changes in each contribute to explaining the basic dynamic fact
established in the previous section.
3.1 Empirical methodology
The rst step in separating hawkishness from condence is to construct a simple theoret-
ical voting model. In the overwhelming majority of meetings (135 of 142), all members
either vote for the same rate, or one of two interest rates. As such, member i's vote in
period t can be modelled as a choice from vit 2 f0;1g, where 0 corresponds to the lower
of two rates and 1 to the higher. Voting for the higher rate should be interpreted as
decreasing expected future ination. In period t an unknown state variable !t 2 f0;1g
6is realized, with !t = 0 corresponding to a \low-ination state" and !t = 1 to a \high-
ination state". Because of the one-member, one-vote ethos of the MPC, and the relative
unimportance of strategic voting eects under majority rule (Goeree and Yariv 2010),
one can model member i's period t vote as a Bayesian decision problem in which she
chooses the high rate (vit = 1) if and only if
b !it  1   i (3)
where b !it is her belief that the economy is in the high-ination state and i 2 (0;1) is
the threshold that this belief must reach, or the \burden-of-proof" needed,8 to justify
voting for the high rate. i essentially captures how tough member i is on ination: the
larger it is, the more evidence she needs of high ination to vote high. We will refer
to a member with a higher (lower)  parameter than another as more hawkish (dovish).
The voting rule in (3) can arise from models in which i represents preferences over the
rate of ination,9 or member-specic aversions to type I and type II errors of ination
outcomes away from the ination target; alternatively, it can arise from models in which
i represents a belief about expected future ination, or a belief about some structural
parameter of the macroeconomy like the supply gap or natural rate of interest.
Condence instead relates to the formation of b !it. Let qt be a common public prior
belief on the probability that the high-ination state !t = 1 has arisen. In addition,
suppose that member i receives a private signal sit  N(!t;2
i) (where these signals
are i.i.d. across members and periods). Here 2
i literally represents the precision of the
private signal, but behaviorally speaking it measures the extent to which the member
is swayed by the conventional wisdom as embodied in qt in his assessment of ination
conditions; a straightforward implication of Bayes' rule is that a member with a lower 2
i
will put more weight on his private signal and less on the public prior. Thus, 2
i measures
the extent to which member i is willing to ignore public forecasts; this could either be
because he has additional information on ination shocks, or another factor, such as a
desire to stand out.
Because the normal distribution satises the monotone likelihood ratio property, the
voting rule in (3) is equivalent to a cuto rule with respect to the signal: member i chooses
vit = 1 if and only if sit  s
it (i;i;qt), the precise expression for which is presented in
appendix A as equation (A.1).
Heterogeneity in the  and  parameters is separately identiable given the prior qt.
To understand why, it is useful to consider gure 1, which plots the probability that a
member will choose the higher rate (vit = 1) as a function of qt. A member who is tougher
8This is the terminology used by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), who use a variant of this setup
to model voting behavior on juries.
9Section B.1 provides such a derivation.
7on ination than another will vote for high rates more often, independently of qt. This is
represented by the horizontal shift in the curve in gure 1a. By contrast, a member with
a higher i than another will be more inuenced by the value of the prior. So, when qt
is low (high) and the public view is that rates should be low (high), the high- member
will vote for low (high) rates more often. This is represented by the rotation of the curve
in gure 1b.

























Theoretical Model of Voting Behaviour:
Effect Of Higher θ
← θ = 0.41, σ = 1.39
θ = 0.55, σ = 1.39 →
(a) Change in Ination Toughness

























Theoretical Model of Voting Behaviour:
Effect Of Higher σ
← θ = 0.55, σ = 1.39
θ = 0.55, σ = 0.67 →
(b) Change in Signal Distribution
Figure 1: Distinguishing Information and Preferences
Notes: These gures show the theoretical probability that a member votes for the high
interest rate (Pr(vit = 1)) in a meeting as a function of the prior belief that the economy
is in an inationary state (qt). The dierent curves represent dierent combinations of
condence and hawkishness to show how the probability of voting high changes.
To actually use this model as an empirical tool requires knowing the public prior
and vit; although votes are observable and we can construct a high and low vote in
any non-unanimous meeting, the rate which corresponds to the high rate (and so vit =
1) is unknown in unanimous meetings since the MPC voting record does not indicate
the other vote under consideration. In order to construct a proxy b vit for vit, Hansen
and McMahon (2011) use a monthly Reuters survey of City of London economists in
which respondents write probability distributions over voting outcomes at the next MPC
meeting. In unanimous meeting, the two rates under consideration are taken as the two
rates on which the market places highest probability.10 In periods with two observed
votes, b vit is set equal to 1 if and only if member i votes for the higher observed rate in
period t.
In order to construct a proxy for the prior, Hansen and McMahon (2011) combine
10Incidentally, the observed rate in the voting record always lies in this set.
8the Reuters data with options price data and the voting record of a shadow MPC, and
extract a single common factor b qt that is used as a proxy of qt.11 The main concern
with this proxy is that two of the three inputs (the Reuters survey and the options price
data) are predictions of what the MPC will do, not necessarily beliefs about inationary
conditions. Hansen and McMahon (2011) explore this issue in some detail, and conclude
that the common factor analysis appears to successfully purge any prediction bias.12
One can then plug the b qt and b vit proxies into the likelihood function (derived in
appendix A) and structurally estimate  and  parameters for dierent subgroups of
MPC members.13 For the purposes of this paper, the two subgroups under consideration
are the population of new and experienced members, as dened in the previous section.
3.2 Application to voting dynamics
Primae facie it is unclear which parameters evolve with time. One can well imagine that
condence levels vary over tenure on the committee. For example, learning by doing
might increase members' ability to perceive economic conditions, which would decrease
the estimated value of i for experienced members. On the other hand, members may
be overcondent in their initial views and listen more to public opinion over time, which
would increase the estimated value of i. At the same time, they may adjust how tough
they are on ination for a variety of reasons (explored in detail in later sections), which
would lead to changes in the estimated value of  for new and experienced members.
Before proceeding to structural estimation, we rst employ a reduced form approach
to attempt to shed light on whether  or |or both|evolve over time. To do this we
introduce our proxy b qt into a probit regression in which the left hand side variable is the
proxy b vit:
Pr(b vit = 1) = 0 + 1D(Experienced)it + 2b qt + 3D(Experienced)it  b qt + it: (4)
One can use the parameter estimates from equation (4)|reported in table 2|to predict
the probability that new and experienced members vote for high rates for dierent value
of b qt. Figure 2 plots these predicted probabilities, which are reduced-form analogues
11This common factor correlates with actual votes as would the theoretical prior: it strongly and pos-
itively predicts the probability a member votes high and has a concave relationship with the probability
that a member dissents from the majority.
12In fact, the data from the shadow MPC, which we describe and use in section 6.3, only go back to
2002. One can also construct a second proxy for qt based on just the Reuters and options data to cover
the entire sample. This proxy also appears to purge prediction bias, and we use it in all subsequent
regressions.
13A potential concern is that within-group heterogeneity contaminates the estimates, but Monte Carlo
simulations presented in Hansen and McMahon (2011) indicate that the estimated  and  parameters
are unbiased estimators of the average  and  of the group members. In some tests below we will use
individual estimates, although we cannot obtain them for all members.
9of the theoretical probabilities in gure 1. Two notable features stand out. First, the
probability that experienced members vote for high rates is lower than the probability
that new members do for almost all values of the prior. This indicates that as members
gain experience, they become more dovish (i.e. their  falls). Second, the slopes of the
curves in gure 2 are similar, indicating that condence remains more or less constant
over time (i.e.  does not change with experience).
Table 2: Estimated coecients for equation (4)
(1)









Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows the estimated coecients for equation (4) using b vit as the depen-
dent (dummy) variable and D(Experienced) (as dened in (1)) and b qt, the proxy for the
common prior, as explanatory variables.
Of course, these remarks are based only on informal observation rather than on statis-
tical testing. To formalize the conclusions, we structurally estimate  and  parameters
for new and experienced members using maximum likelihood estimation on the likelihood
function generated by our model (the details of which are in appendix A). The results
are presented in table 3, and are consistent with the intuitions from gure 2. First, there
is a strong downward shift in the  parameter (from 0.57 to 0.48) that is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. Second, there is no movement, statistically speaking, in the
 parameter. This result is of independent interest, since it suggests that members nei-
ther accumulate additional expertise with experience nor adjust the weight they attach
to public beliefs for any other reason. Instead, voting dynamics are driven entirely by
a shift in the average member's hawkishness. One can use the estimated parameters to
predict the probability that new and experienced members vote for high rates; these are
plotted in gure 3. These curves are quite similar to the reduced form estimates in gure
2, which provides reassurance that the distributional assumptions behind our structural
estimates are not imposing unreasonable patterns on the raw data.
The goal of this section was to decompose the observed shift in MPC voting behavior
from section 2 into a term representing hawkishness and a term representing condence,
























Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of voting high derived from equation (4)
Notes: This gure shows the empirical probability that a member votes for the high interest
rate (Pr(b vit = 1)) in a meeting as a function of the proxy for the prior belief that the
economy is in an inationary state (b qt). The estimated probabilities for new and experienced
members are derived from the estimates of equation (4) presented in table 2. New members
are more likely to vote for the high interest rate for almost all values of the prior.
we will use the term experience eect to refer to the dierence in the estimated  param-
eters for experienced and new members. So, for example, this section has shown that, on
average, the experience eect is negative. While the results of this section get us some
way towards understanding why experienced members vote for lower rates, the question
remains: why does the average member get softer on ination over time?
4 Evaluating Learning
The rst explanation we propose for the experience eect, inspired by the macro literature
on model uncertainty, is that  is not a xed preference parameter, but an uncertain
structural parameter of the macroeconomy, the average belief about which changes over
time. Since the properties of Bayesian learning are well understood, we will not formalize
or explicitly solve a learning model. Instead we will informally discuss what we mean by
learning, and sketch out the properties we believe would be consistent with it.
Consider the simplest possible dynamic model of MPC voting, in which member i
votes in two periods | t = 1 and t = 2. Let i
1 be his prior belief on the value of 
in period 1. Now suppose that some new information arrives (such as actual ination
data after the implementation of the period 1 interest rate) the realization of which is




[0.53 - 0.62] [0.69 - 1.24]
Experienced 0.48*** 1.04***
[0.45 - 0.51] [0.84 - 1.24]
Dierence -0.090*** 0.073
[-0.14 - -0.037] [-0.27 - 0.42]
Clustered, by member, condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  and  for new and experienced mem-
bers. We model i and i in the likelihood function in appendix A as i = 0 +
1D(Experienced)it and i = 0 + 1D(Experienced)it, respectively, and use maxi-
mum likelihood to estimate the  parameters. The last row shows the dierence of row (2)
less row (1).


























Differences by Experience Level
New:θ = 0.57, σ = 0.97  → 
← Experienced:θ = 0.48, σ = 1.04 
Figure 3: Predicted probability functions based on structural estimates of  and 
Notes: This gure plots the predicted probability that a member votes for the high interest
rate (Pr(vit = 1)) as a function of the prior belief that the economy is in an inationary
state (qt) under the assumption that our model, with  and  for new and experienced
members set equal to their estimated values in table 2, generates the data.
12correlated with the true value of . This will cause him to update his belief to some
new value i
2 in period 2. While beliefs formed using Bayes' Rule are martingales, the
average value of i
2 across members could be lower than the average value of i
1 if the
initial average belief on  were biased upwards, or if  itself were a concave function of
some uncertain parameter about which learning occurred, in which case beliefs about 
would form a supermartingale.
The empirical predictions of learning depend on whether it is common (all members
receive the same information about ) or private (members receive private signals on ).
Due to how we conceive of the  parameter, we believe the most natural assumption is
common learning. We model learning about !t as in part private because we think of
it as a frequent, transitory shock whose magnitude is not immediately discernible from
available public data. In contrast, learning about a structural parameter like the supply
gap generally occurs infrequently and only after a long series of observations of historical
interest rate decisions and economic outcomes, both of which are public information.
One way to test for common learning is to see if new members consistently have a
higher estimated  than experienced members who are serving at the same time. It is
consistent with common learning for all members to share the same belief on  which
gradually drifts down over time. By contrast, it is not consistent with common learning
for new members to systematically anchor their beliefs on  above concurrently serv-
ing experienced members, because this indicates that new members are not using the
information of experienced members to adjust their estimates of the  parameter.
While we do not have enough data to estimate the dierence between new and expe-
rienced members for each year of the sample, we can break down the sample into smaller
time windows and estimate the experience eect in each of them. To do this, we estimate
the levels of  and  for new and experienced members just as in table 3, but use rolling
ve-year windows instead of the entire sample. Specically, we rst estimate them using
the rst 5 years of the MPC from June 1997 to May 2002, and store the saved results as
May 2002 (the end of the window). We then advance the window forward by one month
(i.e. one meeting) and repeat the estimates for the period from July 1997 until June
2002. As this procedure progresses, for each month until March 2009, meetings enter and
leave the sample such that every meeting enters in at least one ve-year window, and
most enter many times. The resulting estimates are shown in gure 4.14
The top of the gure traces out the estimated  for new (green dash) and experienced
(red solid) members, while the bottom measures their dierence (experienced minus new)
and plots the 95% condence intervals around it. As one can see, new members consis-
tently have a higher estimated  than experienced ones. In those windows towards the
end of the sample period the gap closes and, although the the dierence remains nega-











2002m1 2003m1 2004m1 2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
Date
Upper 95% CI Hawkishness − New
Experience effect Hawkishness − Experienced
Lower 95% CI
Figure 4: Rolling window estimates of  for new and experienced members
Notes: This gure shows the structural estimates of  for new and experienced members,
as well as their dierence. The estimates are calculated in the same way as the estimates
reported in table 3 except that in this gure we use a rolling 5-year window to derive the
estimates. This means that the estimate for January 2005 (2005m1 on the gure) is based
on a sample of data between February 2000 and January 2005. The rst estimate, reported
as 2002m5, is based a window of data in the window from June 1997 to May 2002; the last
estimate is based on data between April 2004 and March 2009.
tive, it is no longer statistically dierent from zero at reasonable signicance levels; this
is perhaps related to the onset of the global nancial crisis. Moreover, the estimated
 for experienced members appears fairly constant over the time. In a learning model,
this means that, after 18 months, members consistently form the same estimate of . If
learning about  were common, one would expect experienced members to simply tell new
members what the \correct" belief was, or for new members to work out for themselves
what the correct  was from looking at the history of previous voters. The bottom line
here is that a common learning explanation for the experience eect appears unlikely.
One can also evaluate a private learning explanation for the experience eect. A
model of private learning would generate two empirical predictions that we can explore
with the data. First, while individual beliefs can on average decline over time, there
should be at least some individuals for whom the belief on  goes up (or, to use the
notation above, some members i for whom 2
i > 1
i). The most direct way to test this
prediction is to simply estimate the experience eect for each individual separately. In
general, our estimator requires more data than is present in the voting record of just
one member to converge and yield precise estimates. Nevertheless, we run it on all 27
members separately, with results presented in table 4. As one can see, only 17 of the
1427 regressions converge (those that do not converge are indicated with ), and of those
that do converge, the estimates of the experience eect are not terribly precise. Still, the
results illustrate the predominant pattern of declining hawkishness. In 12 of the 17 cases
that converge, the eect is negative, while for the remaining 5 members, two show no
change and three have a positive eect. The only experience eects that are measured as
signicant at the 10% level are negative, of which there are ve.
Table 4: Experience Eect by individual member
Member New Exp Experience eect p-value
Allsop 0.41 0.27 -0.15 0.054
Barker 0.42 0.49 0.08 0.251
Bean 0.50 0.47 -0.03 0.752
Bell 0.40 0.35 -0.05 0.475
Besley . . . .
Blanchower . . . .
Budd . . . .
Buiter . . . .
Clementi 0.62 0.51 -0.11 0.030
Dale . . . .
Davies . . . .
Fisher . . . .
George 0.63 0.52 -0.11 0.046
Gieve 0.54 0.54 -0.00 0.997
Goodhart 0.81 0.54 -0.26 0.227
Julius 0.55 0.32 -0.23 0.067
King 0.81 0.57 -0.24 0.262
Lambert . . . .
Large 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.987
Lomax 0.44 0.49 0.05 0.555
Nickell 0.64 0.33 -0.31 0.138
Plenderleith 0.63 0.52 -0.11 0.042
Sentence 0.67 0.76 0.09 0.746
Tucker 0.58 0.56 -0.02 0.835
Vickers . . . .
Wadhwani 0.45 0.20 -0.25 0.002
Walton . . . .
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of the hawkishness parameter () for individ-
ual members when new and experienced. We model i and i in the likelihood function
in appendix A as i = i + iD(Experienced)it and i = i + iD(Experienced)it,
respectively, and use maximum likelihood to estimate the  parameters. Columns (1) and
(2) reports the appropriate linear combinations of the  parameters. Column (3) reports
the dierence of columns (2) and (1), and column (4) the p-value for the null hypothesis
that the experience eect is dierent from zero. A \" rather than an entry signies that
the corresponding regression did not converge, or converged without producing meaningful
estimates.
In order to obtain more precise results of the experience eect at the individual level,
we measure it for dierent randomly selected subgroups, which we refer to as pseudo-
committees. More specically, we randomly draw nine members from our sample 4,000
times (with replacement), and estimate the experience eect for each pseudo-committee.
Figure 5 displays a kernel density of the estimated experience eects and table 5 tabulates
15the estimates according to their magnitude and estimated signicance. In 98% of cases we
estimate a negative experience eect, and in 38% of cases this estimate is signicant; in
no case do we nd a positive experience eect at a p value less than 0.5. This evidence,
combined with that in table 4, suggests that upward movements in  are relatively rare
on the MPC, and that the overall average fall in  is actually composed of falls in  of
various magnitude at the individual level. A private learning model in which there were
only a small probability that a member responded to new information by increasing his
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Figure 5: Kernel Density plots of estimated experience eect using random combinations
of members
Notes: We construct 4,000 randomly selected pseudo-committees of 9 members. For each
pseudo-committee, we model i and i as described in table 3 and estimate  for new
and experienced members. We compute the experience eect as the dierence in these
estimates. This gure plots the kernel density of the 4,000 experience eect estimates. We
use the Epanechnikov kernel, and set the half-width to the value that would minimize the
mean integrated squared error if the underlying distribution were Gaussian.
The second prediction of private learning is that the variance of the distribution of
individual beliefs should be higher for experienced members (the variance of i
2 should
be higher than the variance of i
1). Conditional on i
1, the realization of i
2 is a random
variable, and, in a private learning model, the individual values of i
2 are not perfectly
correlated. As such, at the population level, the dispersion in i
2 should be higher than the
dispersion in i
1. In order to determine whether this is the case, one can simply compare
the kernel densities for new and experienced members that the above 4,000 replications
generate. These are displayed in gure 6. In fact, the dispersion in the population of
experienced members is less than the dispersion in the new population (the variance of
16Table 5: The experience eect across 4,000 random pseudo-committees
Item Number Per cent
Negative, p-value < 0.01 337 8
Negative, 0.05> p-value > 0.01 633 16
Negative, 0.1 > p-value>0.05 544 14
Negative, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 1,955 49
Negative, p-value > 0.5 450 11
Positive, p-value > 0.5 78 2
Positive, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 3 0
Total 4,000 100
Notes: We construct 4,000 randomly selected pseudo-committees of 9 members. For each
pseudo-committee, we model i and i as described in table 3 and estimate  for new
and experienced members. We compute the experience eect as the dierence in these
estimates. This table breaks the 4,000 estimates into groups according their signs and
p-values for the statistical test of dierence from zero.
the former is 0.00340 and of the latter 0.00376). Thus, apart from a small portion of
pseudo-committees in which experienced members begin voting for much lower rates (the
skewness of the experienced population is -1.163, while for the new it is 0.176), individual
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Estimated Hawkishness in different random samples of MPC members
Experienced Hawkishness
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Figure 6: Kernel Density plots of estimated  for new and experienced members using
random combinations of members
Notes: We construct 4,000 randomly selected pseudo-committees of 9 members. For each
pseudo-committee, we model i and i as described in table 3 and estimate  for new
and experienced members. This gure plots the kernel densities of the 4,000 new  and
experienced  estimates. We use the Epanechnikov kernel, and set the half-width to the
value that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the underlying distribution
were Gaussian.
In summary, we have shown that if a learning model explains the experience eect,
17it would have to be a private learning model. We have then shown that  estimates
generally declines at the individual level, not just the overall population level, and that
the dispersion individual  estimates does not increase over time. While we do not rule
out the possibility that MPC members are uncertain about some structural parameters in
the economy about which they learn, we do claim that the weight of evidence presented
in this section points away from learning as of rst-order importance for explaining the
experience eect. The next section presents an alternative idea|signalling|that seems
to better account for the results of this section.
5 Signalling and Policy Dynamics
Another possibility is that i is a xed preference parameter known only to member i,
and, in line with the papers cited in section 1.1, that new monetary policymakers want
to signal that they are hawkish in order to anchor ination expectations. We formulate a
simple signalling model consistent with these ideas to illustrate how signalling generates
dynamics,15 and show the predicted dynamics are consistent with the evidence presented
in the previous section. We then test an additional prediction of this signalling model:
the experience eect should be independent of whether a member is innately hawkish or
dovish. The voting record of the MPC is broadly consistent with this.
5.1 Model
Suppose member i votes for two periods t = 1 and t = 2 and that i 2 fL;Hg, where
H > L is a xed constant known by member i but not an evaluator, who one can think
of as a representative member of the public. The evaluator instead places probability r
on i = H. We will refer to type L as a Dove and type H as a Hawk. Let R(vi1) be the
evaluator's updated belief that member i is a Hawk after observing the rst period vote
vi1, and  = R(1) R(0) be the dierence in this belief when the evaluator observes a high
vote rather than a low vote in the rst period. In other words,  is the net reputational
reward to voting high in the rst period. To introduce the idea that members care about
their reputation, we assume that vi1 is chosen if and only if
b !i1  1   i    (5)
15In our voting model, a policymaker chooses a discrete (one of two) interest rate, whereas in the mon-
etary literature he chooses a continuous ination rate. This means we must make a dierent equilibrium
construction compared with other signalling papers in the monetary literature, but we do not claim the
underlying economic intuition is original.
18while vi2 is chosen if an only if
b !i2  1   i; (6)
that is, we modify the voting rule in (3) by introducing reputational concerns in the rst
period but not the second. This captures the fact that, at the end of voters' tenures, there
is no future period in which reputation pays o, so that only the current policy payo of a
particular interest rate matters. Here  measures the strength of the signalling incentive
in the rst period: when  = 0 the model is the standard one, and, as  increases
away from 0, the voter cares increasingly about how outsiders perceive his hawkishness.
Appendix B.1 explicitly derives the voting rule in (5) from a model in which the member
places a weight  on the policy payo of his vote (a quadratic loss function in the realized
ination rate about the ination target, with the Hawk using a higher target than the
Dove) and a weight 1    on the evaluator's belief he is tough on ination.
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as the solution concept for the model. One
possibility is that  takes on suciently high values to lead members to always vote for
high rates in equilibrium; however, the MPC voting record indicates that such equilibria
are not reasonable: both new and experienced members sometimes vote for high and
sometimes for low rates. We call a responsive equilibrium one in which both types select
vit = 0 and vit = 1 with positive probability; i.e., the member is responsive to the real-
ization of his signal whether he is a Hawk or Dove. The following proposition establishes
the existence of such equilibria, along with their main empirical implication. The proof
is in appendix B.2.
Proposition 1 Responsive equilibria have the following properties:
1. For all  2 (0;L) a responsive equilibrium exists.
2. The equilibrium value of  in a responsive equilibrium is positive.
3. Let () denote the equilibrium value of  given . Then there exists an  > 0
such that () < () for all  2 [0;].
Although simple, proposition 1 immediately provides a theoretical rationale for the
average experience eect uncovered in section 3. Suppose that members are either Hawks
or Doves; that, in their rst 18 months, they wish to signal their hawkishness; and that
experienced members simply follow their innate policy preferences. Then, if new members
are in a responsive equilibrium, our estimate of their average  is an estimate of
rH + (1   r)L +  (7)
or the average value of  in the population plus a reputation term that is positive. On
19the other hand, our estimate of the average  for experienced members is
rH + (1   r)L: (8)
The dierence between (7) and (8) is , which would explain the experience eect. In
words, because new members care about establishing a reputation as Hawks, they vote
as if they were more hawkish than they actually are,16 while experienced members revert
to their innate policy preferences, and vote for high rates less often.
It is not signalling per se that generates dynamics in the model, but the dierent
weight that members attach to their reputation in periods 1 and 2. One might worry
that the particularly extreme assumption that we have used in supposing that reputation
has zero weight for experienced members is crucial. The third result in the proposition
alleviates these: as long as the weight on reputation falls suciently far for experienced
compared to new members, all of the results continue to hold.17
Proposition 1 also provides a rationale for the evidence uncovered in section 4. Con-
sider the estimates we would recover if we estimated  for an individual who was a Hawk.
Then equations (7) and (8) would become
H +  (9)
and
H: (10)
Thus the experienced eect estimated at the individual level for Hawks would be . But
by the exact same logic, the experience eect at the individual level for Doves would also
be . This observation rationalizes the three main ndings from the previous section.
First, because all new members engage in signalling and experienced members do not, if
one were to take a snapshot of the committee at any given point in time, new members
would have a higher estimated  than experienced ones. Second, if one were to look
at the experience eects at the individual level, they would all fall. Third, the average
distance between new and experienced members is the same: the distribution of estimated
individual  parameters in the new population is simply a mean-shift of the distribution in
the experienced population. All three ndings were, we argued, inconsistent with various
forms of learning, while they are perfectly consistent with a signalling model.
This discussion not only rationalizes the previous empirical ndings, but yields a new
16Note that even though in equilibrium the evaluator knows that this behavior is taking place, and
adjusts his belief updating accordingly, he still increases (decreases) his assessment that member i is a
Hawk after observing vit = 1 (vit = 0).
17Any reputation concerns that operate across all periods would not be separately identiable from
the average .
20prediction: if signalling is relevant on the MPC, we would expect the experience eect
to be type-independent. This is important to test because it provides some independent
verication for the model's plausibility. It also contrasts with learning yet again. Sup-
pose that L and H represented initial beliefs on an unknown  parameter rather than
preferences. Learning would predict a gradual convergence of these non-common priors
over time (Kalai and Lehrer 1994). The prediction also contrasts with a story in which
Hawks coexist with Doves in the rst year before the former \give-in" to the latter and
mimic their behavior.
5.2 Testing type-independence of the experience eect
The rst step in testing the type-independence of the experience eect is to break the
sample into Hawks and Doves. This requires ranking members on the basis of individual
 estimates. To generate this ranking we use three methods:18
1. Rank members on the basis of individual i estimates, which we denote b i. While
this is the ideal measure, we are unfortunately only able to estimate individual
 values for 20 of the 27 members in our sample;19 for the other members, our
maximum likelihood estimator does not converge.
2. Reuse the 4,000 draws underlying gure 5 described in section 4, and, for each one,
estimate the average overall  on the pseudo-committee rather than the average 
for new and experienced members. Then rank members according to the average
of the  estimates on all pseudo-committees in which they are present, which we
denote b Alt
i . To see why this ranking is meaningful, consider some member A with
associated A and another member B with associated B, where A > B. With
a large numbers of replications, members A and B will on average be drawn with
the representative committee member. So, the average of the  estimates on the
pseudo-committees on which A serves should be greater than the average of the 
estimates on which B serves.
3. Rank by total fraction of votes cast that are high.
Table 6 shows the value of each hawkishness metric for each member (the  represents
a value we were unable to estimate). All three metrics produce rankings that are very
close. The Spearman rank correlation between the rankings produced by methods 1 and
18Although the methods presented below rank the members based on their average , the groupings
we arrive at are little changed, and there is no change in the qualitative results, if we instead used
experienced . The advantage of using the average  is that we can compare across the three rankings
for more members.
19We are able to get individual estimates for three extra members compared with the estimates pre-
sented in table 4 because here we only require an average  and not a separate  for new and experienced.
212 (2 and 3) is 0.97 (0.93), which is highly signicantly dierent from zero (ditto). The
similarity can also be seen visually in gure 7, which contains two scatter plots of method
2 against methods 1 and 3. Since the ranking of method 2 is highly correlated with those
of the other methods, and because it ranks 26 of the 27 members (Paul Fisher is excluded
as he is present for only the March 2009 meeting) based on estimated  values, we use
it as our preferred measure. We create a dummy variable D(Hawk)i equal one if b Alt
i is
above the median value (0.509). Figure 7 codes members with D(Hawk)i = 1 as blue and
members with D(Hawk)i = 0 as red.
Table 6: Measures to rank individual hawkishness
Member b i b Alt
i % High Votes D(Hawk)i
Allsop 0.310 0.487 33.3 0
Barker 0.475 0.503 52.1 0
Bean 0.469 0.501 51.0 0
Bell 0.382 0.496 36.1 0
Besley 0.740 0.527 67.7 1
Blanchower 0.124 0.481 2.9 0
Budd . 0.519 66.7 1
Buiter . 0.515 50.0 1
Clementi 0.539 0.514 48.3 1
Dale . 0.508 44.4 0
Davies . 0.512 100.0 1
Fisher . . 100.0 .
George 0.539 0.515 53.4 1
Gieve 0.539 0.509 48.6 0
Goodhart 0.732 0.523 52.8 1
Julius 0.313 0.494 20.0 0
King 0.602 0.537 61.3 1
Lambert 0.442 0.504 50.0 0
Large 0.671 0.526 77.5 1
Lomax 0.475 0.504 48.3 0
Nickell 0.388 0.492 44.4 0
Plenderleith 0.548 0.516 50.0 1
Sentence 0.701 0.525 66.7 1
Tucker 0.584 0.522 59.8 1
Vickers . 0.518 60.7 1
Wadhwani 0.202 0.477 13.9 0
Walton . 0.509 75.0 0
Notes: We construct three measures of individual hawkishness. b i are direct structural
estimates; b Alt
i is the average of the  estimates on all pseudo-committees on which indi-
vidual i served; and \% High Vote" corresponds to the fraction of all the members' votes
for which b vit = 1. D(Hawk)i is a dummy variable which equals 1 whenever b Alt
i is above
the median for all 26 members for whom we can estimate it|we do not have an estimate
for Paul Fisher as he serves only 1 meeting in our sample. Missing values are represented
by \".
Broadly speaking, members with D(Hawk)i = 1 correspond to Hawks in our theoret-
ical model, and those with D(Hawk)i = 0 correspond to Doves. In order to test how the
experience eect varies across these types, we now structurally estimate  for new and old
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(b) Relationship between hawkishness and % of
votes that are high
Figure 7: Ranking individual MPC members based on individual hawkishness
Notes: These gures show the relationship among dierent ways to measure individual
hawkishness. b i are direct structural estimates; b Alt
i is the average of the  estimates on
all pseudo-committees on which the individual i served; and \% High Vote" corresponds
to the fraction of all the members' votes for which b vit = 1. Both gures plot b Alt
i on the
vertical axis; gure 7a plots b i on the horizontal axis and gure 7b plots \% High Vote" on
the horizontal axis. An individual is a Hawk if b Alt
i  0:509 and a Dove otherwise.
the experience eect diers across the types is whether the quantity in the lower-right
corner of the table is dierent than zero. This is not rejected at standard levels of sta-
tistical signicance (and would not be even at the 35% signicance level). Moving away
from statistical testing and simply looking at the magnitudes of the estimates does show
some convergence between Hawks and Doves when new and experienced: the dierence
in the estimated  values is 0.24 when new and 0.19 when experienced. Our message is
not that learning does not take place at all on the MPC, but that the dynamics predicted
by a signalling model better explain the experience eect than the dynamics predicted by
a learning model. Table 7 shows two groups of voters, one more hawkish than another, in
disagreement both during the beginning of their tenures and at the end, with a tendency
to vote for lower rates over time but little tendency towards convergence. We interpret
this pattern as more consistent with signalling than learning.
A second way of testing symmetry is to repeat the kernel density analysis from section
4, but on Hawks and Doves. We again carry out 4,000 random draws from the 27 MPC
voters, but now we draw 7 Hawks and 7 Doves (with replacement), compute the experience
eect for each type separately, and plot the kernel densities of the estimates in gure 8.
The vertical dashed lines in the gure mark the overall group experience eects measured
in table 7; as one can see, the pseudo-committee estimates are concentrated on these
group averages. Table 8 tabulates the estimates.
23Table 7: The experience eect for Hawks and Doves
(1) (2) (3)
Dove Hawk Dierence
New 0.44*** 0.68*** -0.24***
[0.39 - 0.48] [0.63 - 0.74] (0.000)
Experienced 0.37*** 0.56*** -0.19***
[0.27 - 0.47] [0.53 - 0.59] (0.000)
Dierence -0.066 -0.12*** 0.054
[-0.16 - 0.031] [-0.18 - -0.062] (0.351)
Clustered, by member, 95% condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  for new and experienced members ac-
cording to whether they are classied as Hawks or Doves, as described in the text. We
model  and  in the likelihood function in appendix A as
 = 0 + 1D(Experienced)it + 2D(Hawk)i + 3D(Experienced)it  D(Hawk)i
 = 0 + 1D(Experienced)it + 2D(Hawk)i + 3D(Experienced)it  D(Hawk)i;
and use maximum likelihood to estimate the  parameters. The last row shows the dier-
ence between experienced members (row 2) and new members (row 1). The last column
shows the dierence between new and experienced Hawks (column 2) and Doves (column
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Experience effect estimated in different random samples of MPC members
Hawks − Experience effect Doves − Experience effect
Figure 8: Kernel density plots of experience eect on random pseudo-committees
Notes: We construct 4,000 randomly selected pseudo-committees of 7 Hawks and 7 Doves.
For each pseudo-committee, we model i and i as described in table 7 and estimate 
for new and experienced Hawks and Doves. We compute the experience eect as the
dierence in these estimates. This gure plots the kernel density of the 4,000 experience
eect estimates; the thin vertical lines plot the structural estimates of the group experience
eect contained in table 7. We use the Epanechnikov kernel, and set the half-width to the
value that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the underlying distribution
were Gaussian.
24Table 8: The experience eect across 4,000 random pseudo-committees
Split by Hawks and Doves
(a) Hawks
Item Number Per cent
Negative, p-value < 0.01 1,304 33
Negative, 0.05> p-value > 0.01 988 25
Negative, 0.1 > p-value>0.05 583 15
Negative, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 886 22
Negative, p-value > 0.5 190 5
Positive, p-value > 0.5 39 1
Positive, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 2 0
Positive, 0.1 > p-value > 0.05 0 0
Positive, 0.05 > p-value > 0.01 0 0
Positive, p-value < 0.01 8 0
Total 4,000 100
(b) Doves
Item Number Per cent
Negative, p-value < 0.01 521 13
Negative, 0.05> p-value > 0.01 364 9
Negative, 0.1 > p-value>0.05 213 5
Negative, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 1,357 34
Negative, p-value > 0.5 1,009 25
Positive, p-value > 0.5 199 5
Positive, 0.5 > p-value > 0.1 174 4
Positive, 0.1 > p-value > 0.05 38 1
Positive, 0.05 > p-value > 0.01 78 2
Positive, p-value < 0.01 47 1
Total 4,000 100
Notes: We construct 4,000 randomly selected pseudo-committees of 7 Hawks and 7 Doves.
For each pseudo-committee, we model i and i as described in table 7 and estimate  for
new and experienced Hawks and Doves. We compute the experience eect as the dierence
in these estimates. This table breaks the 4,000 estimates into groups according their signs
and p-values for the statistical test of dierence from zero, as well as by Hawks and Doves.
There is in fact some slight evidence of convergence between Hawks and Doves. Some
portion of Doves have a positive estimated experience eect, while the Hawk distribution
is clearly below the Dove. One could interpret Hawks and Doves as partially \meeting-
in-the-middle" after an initial period of more extreme disagreement. We emphasize,
however, that this really is only partial because individuals in both groups fall substan-
tially. Across the replications, 99% of Hawk subgroups and 87% of Doves subgroups
have a negative experience eect. Furthermore, 73% of Hawk subgroups have a negative
experience eect signicant at the 10% level, while only 1% has a positive signicant
experience eect; the corresponding numbers for Doves are 27% and 4%. Thus, while
Hawks appear to contribute more to the experience than Doves overall (although, as ta-
ble 7 shows, not signicantly so), Doves are by no means free of the negative experience
eect. The important intuition from the signalling model is that both types care about
their reputation equally, so both should become less tough on ination as their reputation
concerns decline. Since the downward shift in  for both groups is present in the data,
we again claim the signalling model contributes to understanding voting dynamics in a
way that learning cannot.
5.3 The timing of the experience eect
In models with multi-period signalling, the inuence of reputation is generally declining.
An additional check on the signalling model is that the estimated  declines not just
25before and after some threshold, but year-on-year. Accordingly, we re-introduce the
D(Experienced - 12M) and D(Experienced - 24M) dummy variables from section 2 that
coded members as experienced if they have served more than 12 and 24 months, and
include them both in the structural equations for  and . We also dene a new dummy
variable D(Experienced - 36M) that measures experience past the 36 month cuto and
include it along with D(Experienced - 12M) and D(Experienced - 24M) in a second
regression. The output from both regressions is contained in table 9.
Table 9: Eect of each year of experience on 
(1) (2)
 
First 12 months 0.61*** First 12 months 0.62***
[0.54 - 0.67] [0.55 - 0.69]
12 to 24 Months 0.51*** 12 to 24 Months 0.53***
[0.46 - 0.56] [0.49 - 0.57]
24+ Months 0.48*** 24 to 36 Months 0.49***
[0.45 - 0.51] [0.39 - 0.59]
36+ Months 0.50***
[0.47 - 0.53]
Experience Eects Experience Eects
Year 2 - Year 1 -0.100** Year 2 - Year 1 -0.089**
[-0.18 - -0.020] [-0.17 - -0.0035]
Year 3 - Year 1 -0.13*** Year 3 - Year 1 -0.13**
[-0.20 - -0.061] [-0.25 - -0.0080]
Year 4 - Year 1 -0.12***
[-0.20 - -0.040]
Clustered, by member, condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  for members in dierent years of their
service. For the estimates in column (1), we model  and  in the likelihood function in
appendix A as
 = 0 + 1D(Experienced - 12M)i + 2D(Experienced - 24M)i
 = 0 + 1D(Experienced - 12M)i + 2D(Experienced - 24M)i
and for the estimates in column (2) we include a third dummy variable D(Experienced -
36M) in each equation. These variables indicate whether a member has served the corre-
sponding number of months on the MPC. The bottom rows of the table show the experience
eect for each year of service by subtracting the  estimate for the year of service from the
 estimate for the rst year of service.
The rst column shows that the estimated  coecient declines substantially from the
rst year to the second, and less so from the second to the third; the second shows that
after three years of experience, the  estimate stabilizes completely. This is consistent
with a steady decline of reputational incentives. Not only does the  estimate decrease
over time, it decreases at a decreasing rate. This means that the experience eect is much
more a beginning-of-term eect than an end-of-term eect.
266 Other Dynamic Incentives
We motivated the above signalling model as one in which members signal to control
ination expectations. Of course, as well as policy-motivated signalling, our model is also
consistent with other motivations for signalling hawkishness. This section rst evaluates
two of these alternatives. First we examine whether members signal to advance their
careers. Various measures of career heterogeneity do not correlate in any signicant way
with the experience eect, so we conclude that career concerns do not drive the eect.
Second, we explore if members signal to each other, and again conclude this is unlikely.
We conclude the section by examining another dynamic incentive story other than
signalling|member capture by the nancial industry. Again, we nd little supportive
evidence. This leaves the policy motivation emphasized in the monetary literature as a
principal candidate for rationalizing the dynamic incentive story.
6.1 Career concerns
The career concerns literature, initiated by Holmstr om (1999), maintains that agents seek
to build a good reputation in order to receive better employment opportunities or a higher
wage in the future. The political economy literature has interpreted career concerns as
the desire for reelection. In the MPC context, reappointment in equivalent to reelection.
So, to the extent that a member's reappointment depends on selectors' beliefs about
his hawkishness, he may want to vote for high rates in order to increase the chance of
reappointment.
If career concerns indeed existed on the MPC, one would imagine that their strength
would vary among members. One group for whom they might be more salient are external
members. Internal members are often drawn from the world of central banking and are
appointed to the MPC as part of their more permanent positions at the Bank of England.
As such, they can expect to continue to serve the MPC while they remain as Bank
of England sta. External members come on more as unknown quantities and, if not
reappointed, must nd new employment outside the Bank. Also, external members serve
shorter terms on average,20 and term length has been used as a measure of career concerns
in the past (Leaver 2009). To test this idea, we estimate the experience eect separately
for internal and external members; the results are in table 10. If signalling arose because
because of career concerns, and external members had more career concerns than internal
members, we would expect the experience eect to have a large magnitude for the former.
While the qualitative results of table 10 go in the right direction (the experience eect for
external members is over three times that of internals), the dierence in dierence is not
signicant. We interpret this as showing that the joint movement down with experience
20External members serve three year terms, while three (of ve) internal members serve ve year terms.
27is more robust than any dierential eect of experience between internal and external
members.
Table 10: Internal and external members  Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
D(External)i = 0 D(External)i = 1 Dierence
New 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.059
[0.54 - 0.66] [0.38 - 0.70] (0.496)
Experienced 0.54*** 0.34*** 0.19**
[0.51 - 0.57] [0.19 - 0.50] (0.016)
Dierence -0.059*** -0.20** 0.14
[-0.10 - -0.015] [-0.38 - -0.013] (0.155)
Robust 95% condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  for new and experienced members split
by internal (D(External)i = 0) and external members (D(External)i = 1); those in the
latter group are Goodhart, Buiter, Julius, Budd, Wadhwani, Allsop, Nickell, Barker, Bell,
Lambert, Walton, Blanchower, Besley, and Sentence. We model  and  in the like-
lihood function in appendix A just as described in table 7, but replace D(Hawk)i with
D(External)i, and use maximum likelihood to estimate the  parameters. The last row
shows the dierence between experienced members (row 2) and new members (row 1).
The nal column shows the dierence within new or experienced members between exter-
nal (column 2) and internal members (column 1), as well as the dierence-in-dierences
(bottom right cell).
There are also other divisions on the MPC that one can explore; for example, whether
a member held an academic position prior to joining the MPC. Since the most important
activity that academic research economists carry out is the production of basic research,
they may not care as much about reappointment as non-academics since recommencing
an active research career is increasingly dicult with time spent exclusively in the policy
world. The fact that tenured academics do not face future occupational uncertainty is a
further reason why their career concerns may be lower. Another division along the same
lines is between members who joined the MPC from private sector positions and those
who did not. Members from the private sector are in some sense in the opposite position
to academics: the ability to progress in their careers does not seem to decline with MPC
tenure (in fact, due to the exposure that MPC service oers, it might increase) and their
future job prospects, while not poor, are also not certain. Tables 11 and 12 show the
results. In both cases the experience eect associated with the group we have said should
have less career concerns is less; however, just as for the internal-external division, there
is little statistical evidence of a dierence-in-dierence.21
21Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) have a related nding that monetary policy reaction functions
are homogenous across similar groups to the ones we examine here; they also interpret this as a lack of
evidence for career concerns.
28Table 11: Academic members  Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
D(Academic)i = 0 D(Academic)i = 1 Dierence
New 0.57*** 0.60*** -0.038
[0.49 - 0.64] [0.35 - 0.86] (0.779)
Experienced 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.12
[0.45 - 0.56] [0.25 - 0.53] (0.115)
Dierence -0.056** -0.22* 0.16
[-0.11 - -0.0034] [-0.44 - 0.012] (0.181)
Robust 95% condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  for new and experienced members split by
those members who joined the MPC directly from an academic position (D(Academic)i =
1); this group includes Goodhart, Buiter, Vickers, Allsop, Nickell, Bean, Blanchower, and
Besley. We model  and  in the likelihood function in appendix A just as described in table
7, but replace D(Hawk)i with D(Academic)i, and use maximum likelihood to estimate the
 parameters. The last row shows the dierence between experienced members (row 2) and
new members (row 1). The nal column shows the dierence within new or experienced
members between non-academic (column 2) and academic members (column 1), as well as
the dierence-in-dierences (bottom right cell).
Table 12: Private Sector  Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
D(Private Sector)i = 0 D(Private Sector)i = 1 Dierence
New 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.13*
[0.52 - 0.71] [0.39 - 0.58] (0.052)
Experienced 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.087
[0.44 - 0.57] [0.28 - 0.55] (0.256)
Dierence -0.11*** -0.069 -0.043
[-0.20 - -0.030] [-0.20 - 0.061] (0.582)
Robust 95% condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of  for new and experienced members
split by those members who joined the MPC directly from a private sector appointment
(D(Private Sector)i = 1); this group includes Clementi, Julius, Wadhwani, Barker, Bell,
Lambert, Walton, and Sentence. We model  and  in the likelihood function in appendix
A just as described in table 7, but replace D(Hawk)i with D(Private Sector)i, and use
maximum likelihood to estimate the  parameters. The last row shows the dierence be-
tween experienced members (row 2) and new members (row 1). The nal column shows the
dierence within new or experienced members between non-private sector (column 2) and
private sector members (column 1), as well as the dierence-in-dierences (bottom right
cell).
29To some extent, the career concerns stories we have told for tables 10 - 12 are slightly
arbitrary, and should be taken more as conjecture than fully-edged hypotheses. What
seems less ad hoc to us is the idea that non-academics, internals, and career bureaucrats
have very dierent professional backgrounds and career trajectories. If career concerns
were the underlying driving force behind the experience eect, one would expect the
experience eect to correlate in some way across the divisions we have explored. The
fact that they do not, combined with the fact that the experience eect in general is
signicant and negative across most specications, leads us to the conclusion that career
concerns do not drive the majority of the signalling on the MPC.
6.2 Members justifying their appointment to other members
The next story we explore is more behavioral. We ask whether members may try to
signal their type to other members of the committee in order \t in". It may be that
within the MPC there is a norm that tough stances on ination are best, and recently
appointed members vote for high rates to show that they belong in the group before
gradually reverting to their true preferences. While we do not construct a formal test
of this idea, informal observation is not consistent with it. Table 4 in section 4 displays
estimates of the experience eect at the individual level. Two of the members with the
largest negative experience eect are Professor Charles Goodhart and Sir Mervyn King.
Prior to their appointments to the MPC, both men accumulated vast experience in the
UK monetary policymaking world. Goodhart had spent 20 years as a senior advisor at
the Bank of England,22 while King, after leaving his position as Professor at the London
School of Economics, had been the Bank of England's chief economist since 1991 and
had been instrumental in shaping the analysis of the UK economy as carried out by the
Bank sta. It seems that these two members would not have been very concerned about
proving their credentials to their colleagues on the MPC. On the other hand, since both
were members of the inaugural MPC in 1997, they may have wanted to show that the
new monetary policymaking institution was serious about ination.
6.3 Regulatory capture
A separate idea is that MPC members do not signal at all, but are instead directly in-
uenced by the policy choices that outsiders want to see implemented. The theory of
regulatory capture, articulated by Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974), maintains that gov-
ernment regulators inevitably end up serving the interests of the industries they regulate,
either because they have higher incentives to lobby and pressure the regulators, or be-
22He did not go straight from his advisory position to the MPC, but rather had a post as Professor at
the London School of Economics from 1985 to 1997.
30cause members of the industry that a regulator regulates end up eventually becoming
regulators themselves and vice versa. Commentators both in the media (Frank 2009,
Persaud 2009) and in academia (Baxter 2011) have argued that one of the causes of the
recent nancial crisis was the capture of nancial regulators by the nancial industry.
While the Bank of England is not a nancial regulator (or was not during our sample
period), its policies clearly have a substantial impact on nancial markets. One might
imagine, therefore, that the nancial industry applied systematic pressure on MPC mem-
bers to pursue a \cheap money" approach in order to stimulate lending and borrowing.
During their tenures, MPC members regularly go to ocial dinners, give speeches, and
generally interact with members of the nancial industry. Also, as we have already men-
tioned, some MPC members have come directly from positions in the nancial industry.
So, an alternative story to explain our results is that during their rst 18 months on the
MPC, members pursue what they genuinely believe to be the optimal monetary policy,
but that due to the continuous lobbying eort of the nancial industry, they eventually
give up and begin to vote for lower rates with a higher probability.
Fortunately we have a test of this hypothesis. The Times of London newspaper has,
since 2002, formed its own shadow MPC of monetary policy experts, some of whom are
former, and in some cases future, members of the real MPC. Members of the Times MPC
vote each month prior to the MPC meeting on what they believe to be the best interest
rate, and their votes are subsequently published in the Times newspaper. Since there are
few implications of Times MPC votes for anyone other than the members themselves,
one would imagine that they simply express their genuine opinion about interest rates.
If it were the case that actual MPC members faced industry pressure to keep rates lower
than they genuinely believed to be social-welfare maximizing, then it should be the case
that a member of the MPC votes for systematically lower rates than he would if he were
voting on the Times MPC.
There are ve MPC members (Budd, Goodhart, Lambert, Sentence, and Wadhwani)
who have also served on the Times MPC. As an initial test of regulatory capture, we
compute the frequency with which these members chose the high vote during the rst 18
months on the MPC, their subsequent time on the MPC, and their tenure on the Times
MPC. The results are in table 13. All members apart from Lambert choose the high vote
less often while on the Times MPC than they do as either new or experienced members
of the MPC, which goes against the capture hypothesis. The fact that members vote for
high rates less frequently on the Times MPC than experienced MPC members might also
indicate that some signalling incentives also remain in the nal years of MPC service.
We then estimate the  parameter for the pooled votes of the ve members across
the three periods covered in table 13. Our estimator does not converge when we include
Wadhwani, so we discard him and proceed with estimation of the other four; table 14
31Table 13: Voting on the MPC and the Times MPC:
Fraction of High Votes (%) and count (n) of total votes on dierent committees
Member Times 1st MPC New MPC Exp Times 2nd
(%) (n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%) (n)
Budd . . 67 18 . . 56 77
Goodhart . . 56 18 50 18 33 9
Lambert 75 4 44 18 56 16 . .
Sentence 38 8 72 18 58 12 . .
Wadhwani . . 17 18 11 18 4 46
Notes: This table shows the % of total votes cast that were high, and the total number of
votes, for the ve members who have served on both the Times (shadow) MPC and the
MPC. Two of the ve members (Lambert and Sentence) served on the Times MPC before
their appointment to the MPC while the other three served following their appointment.
presents the results. The estimated  coecient for the Times MPC is slightly below
the coecient for experienced periods on the MPC. This again goes against the capture
hypothesis, which would predict the Times MPC coecient to be closer to the new MPC
coecient than the experienced.










Clustered, by member, 95% condence interval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table shows structural estimates of the average  for members when new to
the MPC (\New"), experienced on the MPC as dened by greater than 18 months service
(\Experienced") and during their service on the Times MPC (\Times"). The nal row
reports the dierence between their service on the Times MPC (row 3) and the experienced
MPC members (row 2). The estimates exclude Sushil Wadhwani.
7 Conclusion
This paper's rst contribution is to show that signicant dynamics are present on the
MPC. After rejecting two separate learning explanations for this (increasing condence
in private information and learning about the macroeconomy), we show that a signalling
model accounts for the dynamics. We rule out two potential motivations for this signalling
32(career concerns and tting in), and a separate dynamic incentive story (regulatory cap-
ture), leaving policy-motivated signalling as a plausible driver of MPC voting dynamics.
Our paper presents two avenues for future research. Specically in the monetary lit-
erature, while we show that the balance of evidence favors a policy-motivated signalling
explanation for voting dynamics, formulating and testing more detailed hypotheses using
richer datasets (for example, analyzing how the behavior of ination expectations derived
from asset prices reacts to observed voting behavior) is a logical next step. Second, within
macroeconomics specically and political economy generally, much recent research has
used the stories we have rejected to understand policymakers' behavior. While we do
not argue that learning, career concerns, regulatory capture, or other behavioral con-
siderations are not important for behavior, we do think the recent existing literature
has underplayed the idea that signalling preferences for policy motivations has a role to
play. As our paper shows that in some settings this role may be the most important,
future work should take such policy-motivated signalling more seriously as a generator of
dynamic behavior.
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35A Likelihood Function Derivation


























where f1  (1;2
i) is the distribution of sit conditional on !t = 1 and f0  (0;2
i) is the
distribution of sit conditional on !t = 0. The rst equality is implied by Bayes' rule and
the second by the distributional assumptions on f0 and f1. The voting rule in (3) can be
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if vit = 0:
We model i =  + D(Experience)i and i =  + D(Experience)i.
B Signalling Model
B.1 Derivation of Voting Rule with Reputational Concerns
Here we derive the voting rule in (5) by adapting the baseline model from Hansen and











Hg is his preferred ination target. The ination rate t is distributed
according to F [t j vi1 ], whose expected value is !t  vi1, and whose variance 2 is nite











one can express the payo of choosing vi1 = 1 as
  ( 1 + b !it   

i)
2 + (1   )R(1) (B.1)
36and that of choosing vi1 = 0 as
  (b !it   

i)
2 + (1   )R(0): (B.2)
Straightforward algebra reveals that (B.1) is larger than (B.2) whenever





(R(1)   R(0)) (B.3)
Dening L = 0:5 
L, H = 0:5 
H, and  = 1 
2 reduces this model to the one in the
main text.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In any responsive equilibrium, both types must vote high if and only if the
realized signal exceeds a nite cuto. Suppose the evaluator believes that type L uses
cuto s
L and that type H uses cuto s















H ] + (1   r)Pr[sL < s
L ]
: (B.4)
It is straightforward to show that (s
L;s
H) R 0 as s
L R s
H. Given the evaluator's beliefs
s
L and s
H, the optimal thresholds for both types s0
L and s0
H are, following the expression














































H, one obtains  > 0. This establishes the second statement in the proposition.
Proving the second statement is equivalent to showing that equations (B.5) and (B.6)
have a xed point. Since  2 [0;1], s0



























for x 2 fL;Hg.  < L is a sucient condition for (B.7) and (B.8) to be nite. Under
37this condition, (B.5) and (B.6) map sx  s
x  sx into sx  s0
x  sx for x 2 fL;Hg.
Moreover, since (B.5) and (B.6) are continuous in s
L and s
H, one can apply Brouwer's
Theorem to establish the existence of a xed point.
To prove the third point, denote by s
x() the equilibrium cuto that type x 2 fL;Hg















holds for x 2 fL;Hg and using the logic from the proof of the second statement completes
the proof.
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